and diverting responsibility for putative falsifications elsewhere. He argued, however, that taking such an approach -as opposed to the kind of view that he favoured -would hold our key ideas as immutable by convention, as opposed to their being open to the kind of growth that Popper favoured, and which was, for him, exemplified by the replacement of Newton's work by Einstein's. Popper, when he wrote The Logic of Scientific Discovery, downplayed his ideas about metaphysics; but one might, with hindsight, say that Popper's response to this problem was chosen because of his concern with the ideal of a fallibilist and realist view of the aims of science. Popper clearly accepted the idea that we should see our knowledge as a system of ideas, and that our response to problems should be in terms of making modifications of our ideas that increase the content of what is being asserted. Perhaps the best brief formulation of this is given in his 'Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Knowledge' (in Popper 1963) . A particularly illuminating interpretation of Popper's philosophy of science that stresses the role played by methodological rules is Ian Jarvie's The Republic of Science (2001) .
Some years ago, I suggested that this aspect of Popper's work had some interesting consequences. The first is that institutions, customs and habits might sometimes play the role of methodological rules in Popper's sense. Second, we might not be aware of this fact, and of its consequences. The result could be (it would be a matter for investigation how significant it was) that there is a discrepancy between the way in which we are understanding an idea -i.e. as a straightforward claim that something is true -and what the idea amounts to as a consequence of how it is being so handled. That is to say, there could be a contrast between the prima facie character of a theory, and the character that it 5 actually has as a result of the rules and procedures that those people who entertain it adopt towards it. A theory might be being held as true, when those who favoured it simply thought that it was true, because of the ways in which the people's institutions and institutional procedures operated. That is to say, they might not understand that their behaviour had these consequences (compare Shearmur 1980 and 1985) . To appreciate what is going on, we may need to understand this discrepancy and its consequences. This would suggest an important reason why we should avoid any approach -such as that of David Bloor (1974) -in which world 3 is treated as simply a mystification of the social.
For if we took such a view, we would lose out on the key interplay between how an idea is understood by those who entertain it, and what its social treatment makes it amount to.
If my suggestion here is accepted, we would be in a situation, familiar to critical rationalists, where the investigation of such things would be a matter for piecemeal learning and (if we are concerned by what we discover about our own ideas) continual improvement. Such an approach could be put to many possible uses. It could form the basis of a theory of ideology (in the sense of offering explanations as to how people are able to hold, in good faith, certain views which are known in the wider community to be problematic). It might also suggest ways in which we might improve our existing institutions in areas which relate to the production and growth of knowledge, where we would take our best current ideas about the philosophy and (normative) sociology of science as a basis on which our other practices could be tentatively appraised. (It would for example suggest the basis for a critique of current governmental schemes to evaluate 6 research, which tends to treat all research as if it amounted to a Kuhnian 'normal science', in which no fundamental changes ever took place.) Should the approach be accepted, it would suggest that Popper's own attitude towards sociological issues relating to the production of knowledge stands in need of modification.
For example, in his 'The Logic of The Social Sciences' (1976a), Popper was critical of an anthropologist who was a participant in a scientific discussion because he was more interested in issues relating to the dynamics of group behaviour than in the substantive content of the discussion. Popper's particular criticism may have been fine. But if I am correct in my argument, there is a genuine intellectual issue here from which we may learn a lot. Popper's own (1945) criticism of the sociology of knowledge was important.
But at the same time, there seems to me every reason to suppose that how we currently conduct our arguments, seminars and so on is not necessarily the best way in which we might do so. Popper's own seminar -at least in its earlier days -was in some ways highly problematic in terms of how it was conducted. (See, for an uncritical account, Bartley's essay in Levinson (ed.) 1982.) While Deborah Tannen, e.g. in Tannen 1994, has written important things about how women may often be excluded from discussions (there are also important discussions of related issues by feminist writers in the philosophy of science; but they raise wider issues than I can discuss on the present occasion).
At the same time, I should stress that the point that I am making relates to the growth of knowledge and what would best serve to further that. It may, indeed, be the case that 7 such epistemological concerns could provide an argument for our according what might be termed 'dialogue rights' to people who currently do not enjoy them. (See, on this, Shearmur 1986a and 1986b.) Institutional change may be required. Compare, on this, John Stuart Mill's Subjection of Women. He there noted that some men claimed that their wives did not object to their position of social subordination. Mill suggested that they might not be objecting as a consequence of their very subordination (of which Mill was critical, and in respect of which he made suggestions for institutional reform).
However, one should not assume that reforms that may be suggested on the basis of such epistemological considerations would necessarily fit our favoured political ideals. If there is such a clash, it also does not necessarily mean that our epistemologically-driven ideas should win out. On occasion there may be other pressing reasons for keeping things as they are.
The Book
So far, I have discussed Popper's ideas about 'world 3', and have then suggested that our approach to world 3 phenomena might usefully be supplemented by concerns which flow from Popper's discussion of 'methodological rules'. In this section, I would like to suggest a further source of supplementation, in this case drawn from issues -which fit the theme of the conference at which this paper was presented -relating to the study of books. Kepler's ideas with theories about celestial 'influences' of a kind for which Galileo would have had no time.) One of the studies with which I will be concerned shortly, discusses the way in which an important work in natural theology was read in strikingly different ways, by different and non-interacting audiences, in early Nineteenth Century
Britain. It is also striking that, say, Popper's own work has been mis-read in terms of the tradition of logical empiricism, and that philosophers who, in broad terms, know a reasonable amount about his work, nonetheless fail to inter-connect it with many current discussions in contemporary philosophy.
methodology, so as to apply to intellectual issues, more generally. 5 Already in Popper's theory of the 'empirical basis' in (Popper 1959) , he had placed emphasis on the intersubjective character of the tentative statements on the basis of which theories are assessed.
And, in (Popper 1945) he had drawn attention to the (Kantian) theme of the 'rational unity of mankind' -to the way in which ideas about public policy might be appraised by anyone. As I have argued elsewhere, 6 the character of effective intersubjective assessment is limited in the sense that on Popper's account, while critical discussion is always important and something from which we might hope to learn, we can only expect that we may reach consensus in rather limited areas. However, inter-subjective critical appraisal is nonetheless at the heart of Popper's approach. But we may usefully ask: how is it to take place, and, in particular, by what means can the notion of the 'rational unity of mankind' be exemplified?
The issue arises in two different contexts: public policy, and science itself. Let me discuss them, and the problems posed for them by work in the tradition of Darnton, in turn.
Public Policy and The Periodical
The idea that inter-subjective criticism of proposals about public policy has an important role to play is, it might be said, a staple idea of liberalism. I will not try to offer a history of this theme. But it plays a key role in Kant's 'What is Enlightenment?', 7 and in Mill's
On Liberty and The Subjection of Women. In each case, a particular concern is with the freedom of the individual to contribute criticism. Kant's concern was with the idea that the public servant, or the church official, should be free to voice criticism, in an academic context, of the policies of their employer. Mill, in addition to arguing for the importance of the freedom of opinion, and that unpopular voices should not be suppressed, also argued that, in the case of women, issues of power (relating, in their turn, to a lack of individual property ownership) might serve to stop women criticizing the views of their husbands. Suppose that such problems were overcome. We would still face two difficulties.
The first of these concerns the problem of specialization. Popper -as part of his critical engagement with Thomas Kuhn, and more generally -deplored the growth of specialization in science. He was concerned with the way in which, as science had developed, people had tended to become increasingly specialized in their work, without having an overview of the wider context into which it fitted. Indeed, with the exception of leading people in different disciplines, scientists tend to be socialized in exactly the way in which Kuhn has described: they increasingly became puzzle-solvers within takenfor-granted intellectual frameworks and traditions, of the content of which (and of the existence of alternatives to which) they were frequently at best dimly aware. For Popper, this was a betrayal of all that science -in the wide sense of cosmology or natural philosophy -should be about. He frequently deplored it, but -or so it seems to me -he did not really suggest what might be done about it. In my view, one reason for this was that it would have involved exactly the kind of exercise that Popper distrusted, but which has been the main topic of the present paper: the need to inter-relate institutional and 'world 3' issues.
An important point was made in the diagnosis of this problem by Robert Young (1985) .
He discussed the way in which the generalist character of key intellectual periodicals in the early part of the Nineteenth Century changed over time. He considered the particular example of the centrality of debates concerning natural theology in the first three decades of that Century. But his study brings out the way in which the circulation of, and the character of contributions to, serious generalist periodicals declined markedly in the last few decades of that Century. Scientists gradually shifted their work to specialist publications, and the quality of 'generalist' discussion declined. The same process has clearly continued through the Twentieth Century and beyond -it is, in this context, worth comparing academic journals from the middle of the Twentieth Century, with their contemporary equivalents.
Popper, and those associated with him, took issue with Kuhn's account of science and its history. It has been argued that the development of science has, historically, been much more pluralistic than Kuhn suggested -with argument taking place at a number of different levels, and work being undertaken from differing perspectives. But what, in the face of this, is to be done? It would seem to me inappropriate to ask for action by government. Better to call for a lessening of control, than to call for more controls in the hope that their consequences will be better. I do, however, have a specific suggestion to make here; for there is a parallel to the suggestion made -to good effect -by Sir Peter
Medawar (Medawar 1964 My suggestion is that we might, in the face of the problem to which I have referred, take off from a comment that Popper made in 'Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Knowledge' (see Popper 1963) . He there set out, over and above the aim of getting nearer to the truth, dealing with experimental facts and resolving theoretical difficulties, three further requirements for the growth of scientific knowledge. The first of thesewhich I'd like here to discuss -was (Popper 1963, p. 241 ):
The new theory should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful unifying idea about some connection or relation (such as gravitational attraction) between hitherto unconnected things (such as planets and apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or 'new theoretical entities' (such as field[s] and particles).
Clearly, it will be unusual -to say the least -that a newly advanced theory is able to do this. But we might, with an eye to the more day-to-day work in which most scientists are engaged, ask that the detailed work be situated, by way of an initial paragraph or two at the start of the paper, within the wider problem-situation towards which it is addressed.
This might well consist of a reference to well-known scientific work, and to the significance of what is being proposed in that context. It might, further, go beyond this to explain, where there is one, the metaphysical research programme (or the intellectual aspects of the 'paradigm') within which the work is being conducted. This leads to my third argument. It is that if such ideas were articulated it would mean that their critical discussion and investigation could become a field in its own right. It would not be removed from science -just because of the inter-relation between the statements being made in scientific work, and this area of investigation. But it would designate a clear field of activity for those -and they are now a growing number -who think that there should be an interplay between philosophy and different substantive disciplines. It would also serve to make sure that those who engage with such issues actually take as their starting-point (but not necessarily uncritically), the current views of scientists, rather than simply inventing their own view of what such ideas 'must' be like.
Politics and the Public Sphere
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The second area in which there are interesting implications concerns the public sphere in the context of politics. We are concerned, here, with deliberation, rather than just with public opinion. 9 Popper's approach to politics has two striking aspects. On the one side, he stresses the fallibility of rulers and those who undertake public policy initiatives, and the need in this (Hayek, 1944) . It is that people involved in a single political unit may simply not be able to agree on the relative merits of different competing proposals for public spending, or their relative priorities. Those who pay attention to empirical and theoretical work on politics and public policy might also comment that the actual process of political decision-making is a far cry from accounts of rational deliberation between citizens, and that it is difficult to see how they could be brought together.
A further problem was posed by Jürgen Habermas. In his Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) , he offered an interesting and provocative account of the way in which a 'bourgeois' reflective, critical public sphere -the kind of thing that grew up among merchants in London coffee houses in the Eighteenth Century -was shattered by the development of a greater degree of democracy. Rather than enhanced forms of deliberation, we got political demagoguery and machine politics. What happens more generally will be different in different countries. In Britain, it is striking that the development of some strands in Protestant Christianity, and the Trades Union movement, offered opportunities to people from working class backgrounds to participate, and to represent the concerns of many people who were previously excluded from discussions.
Yet with the passing of time, and the greater openness of the social system, people who in the past would have played this representative role have typically become bureaucratic functionaries; and a key feature of bureaucracy is the way in which it shuts down independent voices.
10
The kind of high-quality discussion of a sort that exemplified the concerns of Kant, of
Mill -and also of Popper -did exist. 11 But it was typically exclusionary in terms of class and gender. There is now a greater degree of social openness. But the very discussion that was our concern seems to have become a victim of this growing openness. Much the same has also occurred with regard to the media. Historically, a relatively small group of people who had face-to-face relations were involved. The impact of various kinds of technical and organizational change, 12 and subsequently the development of the internet, have -while, again, giving us many benefits -had devastating consequences on the kind of high-quality exchange which used to take place as a matter of routine. What, I would suggest, is needed is an attempt at the creation of social institutions, aimed at addressing these problems.
Before I offer a specific suggestion, I would like to discuss one further aspect of the problem; it again relates to my Darnton-rooted issues concerning the study of the book and its ramifications for our current concerns.
The Common Context -and its reconstruction
The account that I gave earlier of the development of specialization in journals drew on Robert Young's work. He started from the idea that a 'common context' was exemplified, in early Nineteenth Century England, by exchanges about natural theology in high-quality generalist journals. He also placed particular emphasis on the role played by the Bridgewater Treatises, a collection of books on natural theology that appeared from 1833-1840. But work in the Darnton tradition on this very topic has suggested that Young's account over-simplifies the situation. 13 For example, in his 'Beyond the Common Context', Jonathan Topham argued strongly for the diversity of ways in which these works were read, arguing that 'the wide circulation of the series among many classes of readers and … consideration of the distinctive meanings with which the books were invested by readers in divergent cultural groups serves to elucidate the contested meaning of science in the period' (Topham 1998, p. 233) . Similar points have subsequently been made concerning the reading of Vestiges of Creation (Secord 2000) and also by other authors who have raised problems of a more general kind concerning the notion of a common 'public sphere'.
14 It is, indeed, this that poses the problem for 'Popperian' political philosophy that I would like to address. 15 For while the ideas of critical feedback and the rational unity of mankind seem attractive, the difficulty is to see how they are to be given institutional whom; an issue that become complex as a result of increased international mobility of populations. I will not pursue this matter here, 18 but will instead return to the issue of critical feedback.
Popper said in some ways surprisingly little about how a public forum might work in his
Open Society or subsequent writings (although given the huge scope of his interests, it
should not really be a surprise). However, he did address the topic briefly in a paper 'Public Opinion and Liberal Principles', which he gave to the Mont Pelerin Society in 1954 (it is included in Popper 1963) . 19 The paper is largely concerned with offering criticism of a number of what he refers to as myths about public opinion, which he describes as being accepted uncritically (Popper 1963, p. 247) . But one theme in the paper is the contrast that he draws between critical discussion and public opinion. (In this context he also says that: 'the liberal does not dream of a perfect consensus of opinions;
he only hopes for the mutual fertilization of opinions, and the consequent growth of ideas.
Even when we solve a problem to universal satisfaction, we create, in solving it, many new problems over which we are bound to disagree. This is not to be regretted.' (Popper 1963, p. 352) .) What we would seem to need is, first, an institution through which people can address one another with mutual respect; as Popper wrote: '[a] ll that is needed is a readiness to learn from one's partner in the discussion, which includes a genuine wish to understand what he intends to say' (ibid.). But, second, we also have the problem of what institutional means could be used to make it possible for points from anyone to be raised.
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One possibility would be to make use not of an elected assembly (which we would still need to have, for the purposes of practical government), but something modelled on Britain's House of Lords. What I have in mind is a body to which people are appointedafter a process of consultation -to represent different interests in a country. The positions would be ones of high prestige, and people would be paid well for taking them up. This would mean that one could expect people of high calibre to become members, a condition of which would be giving up on their ordinary career expectations. People would only allow their names to go forward -and to be selected -if they were committed to exactly the kinds of conduct that Popper has favoured for those involved in discussion. The people in question would also be picked for their knowledge of, and links to, relevant sectors of society; they would typically be expected to keep in touch with these, on an ongoing basis. They would serve as a means whereby issues raised by people in that sector of society could be raised and discussed in a deliberative manner.
But what, it might be asked, of Popper's concern for the 'rational unity of mankind' -for the input that might be made by ordinary people? It would seem to me, here, that what would be needed is for each member of the House of Lords to be equipped with a large and capable staff, who could respond to those who wished to raise issues relating to the Member's interests and concerns. The Members, themselves, would include people who might have a background in different sectors of society -including industry (both management and trades unions), commerce, education, and various charitable sectors.
Their staff would have the brief of handling representations from any member of the public, with a concern in any of these fields (other than requests for services etc, which 23 would be handled by the first chamber, as occurs at present). They could undertake research (and, indeed, suggest topics for investigation by House of Lords committees; such committees should have the power to require that anyone -public servants included -answer their questions). All this, while not destroying the coherence of government policy, and its electoral accountability, would do a lot to redress the loss of discursive accountability that is a feature of current politics. (Specialized committees of such a reformed House of Lords, with appropriate security clearance but no government majority, could also perform the vital task of monitoring the activities of the security services and police.) The existence of such a body would also provide an obvious focus for the concerns of the writers of opinion pieces, and the activities of think tanks and of bloggers. It might do a lot to improve the ways in which they currently operate if they had to think of the deliberations of such a body as being the potential focus of their activities.
It might be objected: but this does not offer a direct voice to the individual. That is true.
But it is not clear that that is what would be needed to address Popper's concern. For after all, on many topics which may affect our well-being we may not be well-informed or be able to understand the character of some of the constraints that policy-makers are under. In addition, we may not be in a good position to put our points well: recall the old saying 'A man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.' What my suggestion would offer is a way in which points from anyone could be turned into issues suitable for deliberation, and through which those in power could be compelled to respond to them.
One further problem is that there is obviously an international dimension to many of our current problems, while the kind of institution to which I have referred is very much national in its character (and something that builds upon existing national traditions). It is not clear that one can easily construct a public sphere on an international basis: the EU looks a complete failure in this respect, not least because we typically do not understand the background and traditions from which others are coming. But it might, surely, be possible to have representation in a House of Lords (or its equivalents elsewhere) from those with concerns overseas -whether in Europe, or internationally; equally, of those with links to management or to labour overseas. It is not obvious how such matters are best tackled; but experimentation is surely possible.
Conclusions
I have covered a lot of ground in a single and rather short paper. I can, however, sum up fairly quickly.
My argument has been, first of all, that we need to take Popper's ideas about world 3 seriously.
Second, I argued that we should not here pay attention just to logical issues, but also to methodological ones. Popper himself placed great emphasis on methodological rules, and on how, depending on which of these we adopted, the cognitive status of our ideas might be changed by them. (There is a theme in common between Popper's work, and the 25 notion of the 'pragmatic a priori'; cf. Lewis 1923.) My suggestion, further, has been that we can usefully consider the way in which our institutions and procedures may serve as methodological rules, and can thus be seen as having various epistemological consequences of which we may not ordinarily be aware. It is possible for us to investigate, in a piecemeal manner, what these might be, 20 and how their operation might be improved. These are, thus, matters of which we may seek to become more conscious; although our understanding is likely, at any point, to be provisional, and thus something
that may be open to further improvement. What all this calls for is not the collapsing of world 3 into the 'social', but an investigation into the interplay between world 3 and our institutional procedures, and, in a Popperian spirit, for this to be undertaken with an eye to improving how our institutions might function.
Third, it is in the context of the interplay between world 3 and sociological factors that I was suggesting we might re-visit the theme of the conference at which this paper was presented: the book. For while the book stands, in one sense, almost as a paradigmatic material instantiation of a world 3 object, it has also been the subject of most interesting historical and sociological re-investigation. As I have explained, I am here referring to work undertaken in the tradition of Darnton's study of the book. I have said a little about this work and its interest (although it seems to me that, to this work, there also needs to be brought a Popperian concern for progress in knowledge, in a world 3 sense). I hope that what I have had to say about this has shown both the interest and the promise of this growing field -into which, on the present occasion, I have just made an initial foray.
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Finally, I have suggested that we might bring what we learn from such work back to the field of Popperian piecemeal social engineering. In the concluding parts of the paper, I
have made some suggestions about how, if I am right as to some of the problems that face us, we might possibly respond, by way of changes to certain of our scientific and also political institutions and procedures. These ideas are, obviously, set out in a manner that is brief and sketchy. But I would hope that they will, at least, have shown the potential interest of the issues with which I have been dealing -even if the kind of interest that they have kindled, is simply one, on the part of readers, in showing just how mistaken they are.
